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How Party Linkages Shape Austerity Politics: Clientelism and Fiscal 
Adjustment in Greece and Portugal during the Eurozone Crisis 
Alexandre Afonso, Sotirios Zartaloudis and Yannis Papadopoulos 
Abstract Drawing on an analysis of austerity reforms in Greece and Portugal during the 
sovereign debt crisis from 2009 onwards, we show how the nature of the linkages between 
parties and citizens shapes party strategies of fiscal retrenchment. We argue that parties 
which rely to a greater extent on the selective distribution of state resources to mobilise 
electoral support (clientelistic linkages) are more reluctant to agree to fiscal retrenchment 
because their own electoral survival depends on their ability to control state budgets to 
reward clients. In Greece, where parties relied extensively on these clientelistic linkages, 
austerity reforms have been characterised by recurring conflicts and disagreements between 
the main parties, as well as a fundamental transformation of the party system. By contrast, 
in Portugal, where parties relied less on clientelistic strategies, austerity reforms have been 
more consensual because fiscal retrenchment challenged to a lesser extent the electoral base 
of the mainstream parties. 
KEYWORDS austerity, clientelism, Eurozone crisis, Greece, political parties, 
Portugal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Which factors shape the willingness of political parties to pursue or agree to fiscal and 
welfare retrenchment? Earlier literature emphasised that the default strategy of political 
parties, independently of their ideological orientation, was to steer away from unpopular 
measures of retrenchment to avoid electoral blame (Pierson 1996; Weaver 1986). More 
recently, however, research has shown that parties display different stances towards 
retrenching the welfare state (Allan and Scruggs 2004), and that some parties can even 
be rewarded electorally for retrenching social programs (Giger and Nelson, 2011; 
Schumacher et al. 2013). In general, this literature assumes that ideology is the main 
factor that shapes party policies and their electoral consequences: linkages between 
voters and citizens are assumed to be primarily programmatic (Häusermann et al. 2013: 
232). However, ideology is only one mechanism of linkage between parties and 
citizens: many parties around the world do not win elections only because of their 
ideological programs, but also thanks to the selective material resources (cash transfers, 
jobs, services, rents, investments or privileges) that they are able to deliver to targeted 
groups in exchange of votes (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 2). In spite of its 
prevalence, this type of clientelistic linkages has generally been overlooked in analyses 
of fiscal and welfare retrenchment (Häusermann et al. 2013: 232) 
In this article, we argue that the extent of these clientelistic linkages can shape 
party strategies towards austerity reforms. We show that parties that draw extensively 
on clientelistic linkages seek to avoid or delay agreements on fiscal retrenchment 
because their own electoral survival depends on the control of a sizeable public sector, 
regulatory powers and budgets as levers to mobilise electoral support. By contrast, 
parties that rely to a lesser extent on clientelistic linkages have a larger margin of 
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manoeuvre vis-à-vis fiscal retrenchment because their electoral fortune is less tied to 
public spending as an electoral resource.  
To support our argument, we draw on a comparative analysis of austerity 
reforms in Greece and Portugal during the sovereign debt crisis between 2009 and 2012. 
Greece and Portugal are two countries – together with Ireland, Cyprus and Spain1 – that 
were granted bail-out packages by a so-called “Troika” of international financial 
institutions (European Central Bank, European Commission and International Monetary 
Fund), in exchange of which they committed to implement drastic “adjustment 
programmes” which involved cuts in wages and dismissals in the public sector, cuts in 
welfare expenditures, as well as tax increases (Armingeon and Baccaro 2012; 
Zartaloudis 2014). 
Despite many similarities in their political, economic and cultural settings, the 
political process underpinning these adjustments has differed sharply (New York Times 
2012; Financial Times 2011b). While cross-party cooperation has been an important 
feature of the reform process in Portugal, Greek mainstream parties have used extensive 
blame-shifting strategies against each other, and cross-party cooperation only emerged 
very late (Vasilopoulou et al. 2013). This difference in the political process is important 
because, in a context of latent political instability, domestic consensus has been 
repeatedly mentioned by lenders as a precondition for the long-term viability of fiscal 
adjustment and the possibility for future bailout packages across electoral cycles 
(Financial Times 2011b).  
In this article, we investigate the factors that prevented such compromises from 
coming about. We explain differences in the politics of reform by a greater prevalence 
of clientelistic linkages in Greece than in Portugal as measured by a number of 
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indicators: the extent of party patronage, the use of clientelistic appeals as a way to 
mobilise electoral support, the organisational form of parties and their relationships with 
influential organised interests, notably the trade unions. In Greece, the need to satisfy 
tightly connected clienteles exchanging their electoral support for public spending has 
ruled out open support for austerity from the main parties in the period under 
consideration, and delayed cross-party agreements. In Portugal, looser connections with 
unions, a smaller reliance on clientelistic linkages and the smaller membership of 
parties has constituted a smaller constraint to implement austerity reforms, allowing for 
extensive pro-retrenchment compromises.  
Our contribution is both empirical and theoretical. Empirically, we provide a 
comparative analysis of the politics of austerity reforms in Greece and Portugal during 
the Eurozone crisis drawing on original material. This subject has attracted a fair 
amount of attention, however with little comparative analysis (see, however, Maatsch 
2014; Armingeon and Baccaro 2012). Theoretically, we connect party linkages with 
fiscal retrenchment in a novel way, building on recent literature on party politics and 
welfare retrenchment. The paper is structured as follows. First, we outline how party 
linkages influence fiscal retrenchment. Second, we outline variation in party conflict 
and compromise in our two countries. The conclusion synthesises our interpretation of 
the findings, assesses alternative explanations and briefly discusses issues of external 
validity. 
CLIENTELISTIC LINKAGES AND FISCAL AUSTERITY 
Most analyses of party competition in European democracies rely on a model of 
“responsible party government” based on the idea that electoral linkages are essentially 
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programmatic (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 7). The congruence of voter preferences 
and parties’ ideological programs is understood as the main mechanism that drives 
policies and determines electoral fortunes (Häusermann et al., 2013: 232-233). In this 
perspective, the ideological positioning of parties is thus the relevant variable to explain 
the willingness to retrench the welfare state or roll back public spending (Allan and 
Scruggs 2004).  
However, this idea of programmatic linkages based exclusively on ideology fails 
to account for a large part of the interactions between voters and parties in many places 
around the world (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 7). In many instances, the ideological 
platform of parties is often ill-defined, erratic, and weakly differentiated. In these cases, 
material resources (public sector jobs, social benefits, tax cuts, market monopolies or 
public investment) are often more important than ideological platforms as a mechanism 
to build voter support. Following Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), we call these 
clientelistic linkages, defined as mechanisms of exchange in which selective goods are 
traded by parties in exchange of votes. Party patronage, or the “power of parties to 
appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life” (Kopecký and Mair 2012b: 
3) has been a particularly widespread form of clientelistic exchange, for instance in the 
political machines of US cities in the 19th and 20th century (Shefter 1994), Southern 
Europe (Hopkin 2001), or Eastern Europe (Kopecký and Spirova 2011; for an overview, 
see Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni 2001).  
While programmatic linkages are universalistic – they entail the distribution of 
public goods that theoretically benefit everyone (public safety, economic growth, clean 
air) –, clientelistic linkages tend to be particularistic. They rely on the distribution of 
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private or club goods from which non-supporters can be excluded. Kitschelt (2007) 
identifies a number of these goods and the channels whereby they are distributed: social 
policy benefits targeted at particular groups based on party or union affiliation (Ferrera, 
1996); or public sector patronage whereby votes are rewarded with public sector jobs 
for loyal supporters (Kopecký and Mair 2012b).  
By contrast to programmatic linkages, which take place within “impersonal” 
electoral markets, clientelistic linkages need “thicker” social networks to operate. 
Clientelistic exchange implies arms-length mechanisms of monitoring ensuring that 
both patrons (parties) and clients (voters) deliver on their promises. For instance, mass 
party organisations can facilitate clientelistic exchange because they provide the social 
networks through which the exchange can take place, and where supporters can be 
mobilised and rewarded (Belloni et al. 1979: 255). Networks of clientelistic exchange 
can also entail tight organisational connections between parties and mass-based 
organised interests, such as trade unions, where the electoral support of trade union 
members is exchanged for future jobs, pay increases, or benefits targeted at specific 
occupations (Trantidis 2014). We do not argue that large party memberships or organic 
connections between parties and unions necessarily lead to the development of 
clientelistic linkages, but that clientelistic strategies need these structures to develop 
into “mass clientelism” as a system to distribute state resources. As shown by older 
work on the Christian-democratic party in Southern Italy, “mass clientelism” – as we 
document for Greece – is particularly likely to emerge within parties that combine the 
“thick” networks of mass parties with the logic of selective exchange of machine parties 
(Belloni et al. 1979: 255). 
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Our argument is that the strength of these clientelistic linkages between parties 
and voters lowers incentives for agreeing to fiscal retrenchment. We define fiscal 
retrenchment as policy measures to reduce the level of public borrowing and debt 
through spending cuts or tax increases. The main reason behind this is that parties 
relying on clientelistic linkages are more closely tied to the state as a resource, along the 
lines outlined by Katz and Mair (1995) in their “cartel party” model. The distribution of 
political rents requires access to public office, so that a history - or the prospect - of 
incumbency is a requirement for the development of clientelistic linkages. In our 
analysis, the viability of clientelistic linkages is facilitated by a large public sector 
and/or an extensive leeway in spending power, which allows political patrons to reward 
clients via spending and favourable regulation (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 36ff.; 
Müller 2006: 190). Another way to maintain clientelistic networks can be the ability to 
allow certain groups to free-ride, namely to enjoy public services without paying for 
them, for instance via tax exemptions or inadequate tax collection.  
Insofar as fiscal retrenchment precisely rules out these strategies, we can assume 
that it entails more important electoral consequences for parties which rely on extensive 
clientelistic linkages. The capacity to distribute political rents via spending or tax 
exemptions is the main resource that these parties have. Hence, such parties will be 
more reluctant towards fiscal austerity because its likely electoral consequences will be 
larger. By cutting spending or increasing taxes, budget austerity basically undermines 
their own electoral strategies, because they curtail the capacity of patrons to reward 
clients via public spending or tax exemptions. If the ability to reward clients disappears, 
there is little left that connects voters and parties, and electoral sanctions are likely to be 
very severe as voters will start looking for alternative patrons. Programmatic parties 
8 
 
may be more resilient in these contexts: “true believers” may continue to trust their 
party even if it has to take hard decisions (Green-Pedersen 2002: 36), while “client 
voters” may more easily defect. 
CASES AND INDICATORS 
In this article, we use a comparative case study to explain the diverging capacity of 
Greek and Portuguese political parties to agree on fiscal adjustment reforms during the 
two years that followed the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis from late 2009 
onwards. Our dependent variable is the politics dimension – namely different degrees of 
capacity and willingness to strike compromises about fiscal retrenchment - rather than 
the policy dimension, such as the extent of austerity measures, or actual reductions in 
public debt.  
Our independent variable is the extent of clientelistic linkages, which tend to be 
difficult to measure because of their fluid nature. However, its is possible to draw on a 
number of indicators to operationalise them as an independent variable. First, the size of 
party organisations in relation to the electorate can be understood as a facilitator of 
clientelistic exchanges: large party memberships provide an identifiable pool of voters 
to be mobilised, monitored and rewarded which also extends within the broader 
electorate through social networks. The second indicator is the nature of party-union 
ties. Modern clientelism rarely relies on individual relationships between politicians and 
voters, but rather on relationships between patron (parties) and client organisations, 
such as trade unions delivering votes from their members. Formal or informal 
connections between unions and parties therefore facilitate clientelistic exchange, 
especially with high levels of unionization within the public sector, where parties can 
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control appointments. A third indicator is the extent of party patronage as measured by 
Kopecký and Mair (2012b), who differentiate between patronage as an organisational 
resource - the appointment of partisan supporters at higher echelons of the 
administration as a way to exert control over bureaucrats - and patronage as an electoral 
resource - the action of rewarding supporters with public sector jobs, mostly at lower 
levels (Kopecký and Mair 2012b). This latter aspect is the relevant one for our analysis, 
with more obvious implications for public spending. Fourth, we use the extent to which 
parties rely on particularistic appeals to gain votes as measured by a survey conducted 
by Kitschelt (2013), in which experts were asked the extent to which different parties 
relied on particularistic instruments (social benefits, public sector jobs, government 
contracts, regulation) as a mode of electoral mobilisation. As we show below, Greece 
and Portugal display consistent variation as to these four types of indicators. 
Greece and Portugal are cases in point to assess our theoretical propositions 
because of the similarities in their economic, cultural and political conditions 
(Zartaloudis 2013b: 1179), allowing for a most-similar systems design (Bosco and 
Verney 2012; di Mascio et al. 2010). Besides being the countries that have been most 
severely hit by the sovereign debt crisis, Greece and Portugal also displayed a number 
of similarities at its beginning: similar levels of socio-economic development, similar 
features in their welfare state (Ferrera 1996), similar sizes, they became democracies 
during the “third wave” of democratisation in the mid-1970s, and both joined the EU 
(European Union) in the 1980s. At the outbreak of the crisis, both were governed by 
centre-left governments, respectively PASOK in Greece and the Socialist Party in 
Portugal. Accordingly, our focus is the period in office of the Papandreou (2009-2011) 
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and Socrates (2009-2011) centre-left governments, which allows for the partisan 
composition of government to be kept constant.2 
Besides these similarities, Greece and Portugal display a substantial degree of 
variation in the extent of clientelistic linkages (our independent variable) as measured 
by the indicators mentioned above. Party patronage and clientelism have been a 
prominent feature of party systems in Southern Europe as a whole (di Mascio et al. 
2010; Hopkin 2001). However, Kopecký and Mair (2012a: 367) show that there is 
significant variation across European countries. Greece ranked first in Europe in terms 
of the pervasiveness of party patronage, while Portugal ranked 10th and below the 
European average. Patronage in Portugal takes place at the higher echelons of the 
bureaucracy, and is used by parties as a means of control over it (Jalali et al. 2012). By 
contrast, it reaches all the way down to the lower levels in Greece, and is used both as a 
tool of (policy) control (at the top) and of (electoral) reward (at the bottom) (Pappas 
2013). As we have argued that mass parties can provide a particularly favourable 
receptacle for clientelistic linkages, we also find substantial differences between Greece 
and Portugal in the size of party organisations. The ratio of members of the two main 
parties to the electorate in Portugal in 2005 was 2.2%, as compared to 6.1% in Greece, 
the highest in Southern Europe apart from Cyprus. The ratio of party members amongst 
voters was 9.4% in Greece, and 4.5% in Portugal (Bosco and Morlino, 2006: 4). 
Besides, the two main Greek parties relied to a much greater extent on clientelistic 
appeals to win votes, particularly with respect to the use of public sector employment, 
government contracts and regulation, indicating a greater importance of clientelistic 
linkages as measured by Kitschelt (2013).  
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Interestingly, this difference in clientelistic appeals is not reflected in the 
ideological positioning of the parties as measured in the same expert survey: Portuguese 
parties were even slightly more interventionist than Greek parties as measured by their 
left-right position, however not in all aspects. Finally, as we show below, relationships 
between parties and trade unions also differed substantially, with both Greek parties 
maintaining connections to the biggest trade union through party factions, whereas the 
biggest Portuguese trade union CGTP has kept distant relations to the main parties 
because of its organic relationship to the Communists. Unions are also much better 
implanted in the public sector in Greece. As a whole, we find a clear variation between 
our two cases as to indicators of clientelistic linkages. 
 
Table 1: Indicators of Clientelistic Linkages and Ideological Positioning 
 Greece Portugal 
 PASOK ND PS PSD 
1.a Party members as share of 
voters (2005) (Bosco and Morlino, 
2006: 4, 7) 8.30% 10.40% 2.90% 7.10% 
1.b Party members as share of 
electorate (2005) 6.10% 2.20% 
2.a Connections of parties to trade 
unions Strong Strong 
Moderate 
(UGT) Weak (UGT) 
2.b Union density in the public 
sector (EIRO 2011a, b) 78.2% 15% 
3. Index of party patronage 
(European mean 0.34) (Kopecký 
and Mair 2012a: 367) 0.62 0.29 
4. Extent to which party uses 
public sector jobs as electoral 
strategy (Kitschelt 2013)3 
3.6  
(moderate to 
major effort)  
3.6 
 (moderate to 
major effort 
2.56 
(minor to 
moderate 
effort) 
2.56 
(minor to 
moderate 
effort) 
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Ideology 1: Preference for state 
role in governing economy (1: 
weak-10: strong) (Kitschelt 2013) 5.14 3 5.89 3.42 
Ideology 2: Preference for public 
spending (1: low-10: high) 
(Kitschelt 2013) 6.27 4.0 5.95 3.42 
 
CROSS-PARTY AGREEMENTS AND CONFLICTS DURING THE 
SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 
In this section, we rely on an analysis of government reports, official documents and 
articles in the national and international press to reconstruct the political processes in 
the two countries. 
Parties and Austerity Agreements in Portugal 
In Portugal, clientelistic linkages have been limited by a number of institutional and 
historical factors. First, Portuguese mainstream parties haven’t built mass organisations 
which could function as political machines for the distribution of spoils to supporters 
because of the nature and pace of the democratisation process: mainstream parties were 
“parachuted” from above after the end of the authoritarian regime of the Estado Novo 
(1933-1974). They did not emerge from below out of distinct class or religious 
cleavages, and their resources were devoted primarily to the organisation of the new 
democratic system rather than to building a mass partisan base (Jalali 2007: 86-87; Van 
Biezen 1998: 38-44). As the old regime showed little interest in mass mobilisation, new 
parties could not rely on pre-existing intermediary networks linking state and citizens 
(Van Biezen 1998: 38). With the exception of the Communist party, the only one with a 
real (but clandestine) presence during the dictatorship, the PS (centre-left) and PSD 
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(centre-right) have displayed a small membership, a weakly defined class basis, and 
loose connections to voters (Jalali 2007: 87). Rather than building a strong grip within 
society with extensive organisations, parties have opted for a shallow but broad catch-
all appeal instead. Hence, the kind of arms-length relationships between parties and 
voters that clientelistic linkages entail were difficult to build in Portugal. 
Second, the democratisation process also conditioned the relationships between 
political parties and trade unions as potential clients. The largest union confederation 
CGTP, implanted among industrial workers and the public sector, has maintained an 
organic link with the Communist Party because of its strong influence within the labour 
movement prior to the revolution (Jalali 2007: 90; Van Biezen 1998: 52-53). However, 
the Communist party has been systematically excluded from government due its 
distance from the PS, so that any left coalition has proved unviable (Magalhães 2012: 
311). The UGT, created by the PS and PSD to challenge the CGTP, managed to gain a 
foothold among white-collar and service workers in the private sector, but never 
challenged the CGTP as the largest labour union. Hence, the largest public sector union 
has been connected to a party lacking access to incumbency at the national level, 
thereby undermining organic channels for clientelistic exchange. Moreover, union 
density in the public sector has been low, at about 15% in 2011 (EIRO 2011b).  
Finally, even if party patronage may have been an electoral resource in the past, 
for instance during the period of economic growth of the 1990s, the period between 
1999 and 2008 was one of long stagnation for Portugal by contrast to other Southern 
European countries (Amaral 2010: 43-44) (see online appendix4). This made public 
sector expansion as an electoral strategy more problematic and its costs more visible. 
The 2000s were marked by anaemic growth and relative decline with respect to the EU 
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average. In this context, the centre-left Socialist government of José Socrates elected in 
2005 carried out a number of reforms already geared to fiscal consolidation, including 
an encompassing pension reform and a series of privatisations, and it stopped the 
expansion of public sector employment (Royo 2012: 193-194). On the right, the PSD 
had been excluded from power for extended periods which effectively undercut its 
ability to rely on clientelistic linkages to reward supporters. After 1995, it has only been 
in power for a brief period (2002-2005) as part of a coalition with the CDS-PP, while 
the PS ruled between 1995-2002 and 2005-2011. 
After the elections of 2009, the Socialists lost their absolute majority and formed 
a minority government. In the direct aftermath of the financial crisis, the government 
first adopted a number of expansionary social policy measures to cope with rising 
unemployment (Zartaloudis 2014). As of early 2010, however, as the deficit, public 
debt and yields on government bonds increased, a much clearer austerity turn was taken. 
Many “anti-crisis” measures were withdrawn, and the government engaged in a series 
of austerity packages geared to reassure financial markets. Given the staunch opposition 
of parties on the left (Left bloc and Communists), majorities could only be built with 
centre-right parties (PSD and CDS-PP). 
The PSD chose to cooperate with the Socialist minority government in order to 
enable measures of fiscal consolidation. The 2010 budget, for instance, was passed with 
the passive support of the PSD and the CDS-PP, with whom an agreement could be 
found after a number of concessions were made in the timing of fiscal consolidation 
(Expresso 2010). Along similar lines, the minority government managed to pass three 
austerity packages with the informal support of the PSD over a period of 18 months. 
The first austerity package (Programa de Estabilidade e Crescimento) of March 2010 
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sought to bring down the deficit to 2,8% of GDP over a period of 3 years, with spending 
cuts of about 2,73% of GDP after 3 years, and 0,84% in tax increases (Ministerio das 
Finanças 2010: 4). This package, again, was negotiated and agreed with the PSD, who 
again enabled its adoption by abstaining (Jornal I 2010). The second austerity package 
(Pacto de Estabilidade et Crescimento II), adopted in April 2010, was again jointly 
agreed between the Socialist prime minister José Socrates and the new leader of the 
opposition elected in March of that year, Pedro Passos Coelho. The package provided 
for a 1.5% increase in income tax and a 1% increase in VAT. The total extent of 
spending cuts was about 7.8 billion euros (Diário de Noticias 2010; Diário Económico 
2010). The third austerity plan PEC 3, tied to the 2011 budget, was presented shortly 
afterwards. It included a five per cent cut in the public sector wage bill, and another two 
per cent increase in value-added tax. In this second package however, the cross-party 
alliance linking the PS and the PSD began to weaken, as the latter contested the extent 
of tax increases to balance the budget (Financial Times 2011c). In the end, the PSD still 
reluctantly supported it, while all other parties voted against it (Público 2010a).  
Eventually, the fourth austerity package PEC 4 presented by Socrates failed to 
pass in parliament on March 23, 2011. This fourth austerity plan provided for spending 
cuts equivalent to 2.4% of GDP and an increase in revenue equivalent to 1.3%, 
including a freeze in pensions and other social benefits (Diário Económico 2011a). 
Arguing that this fourth package had not been negotiated with the opposition - and 
taking advantage of favourable opinion polls – the PSD withdrew its support altogether, 
and the plan failed to gain a majority (Correio da Manhã 2012). As a result, Socrates 
resigned from his position as prime minister, and new elections were called for early 
June 2011. In the meantime, as yields on Portuguese government bonds increased to 
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unmanageable levels, the caretaker PS government asked for financial assistance from 
international financial institutions. The economic adjustment programme subsequently 
agreed between the Troika, the government and the other major parties likely to form a 
government, the PSD and CDS-PP, provided for many of the measures that had been 
voted down in the Socialist government’s fourth austerity package (European 
Commission 2011). 
The elections held on June 5th 2011 marked the victory of Pedro Passos 
Coelho’s PSD, who received 39% (up 9.6% in comparison with 2009) of the vote 
against 28% for the incumbent Socialists of José Socrates (down 8.5%) (Magalhães, 
2012). Interestingly, the PSD promised during the electoral campaign that it would even 
go “further than the Troika” requirements in reducing the deficit (Diário de Noticias 
2011). Even if the PSD failed to gain a majority alone, it was able to build a coalition 
with the CDS-PP, thereby securing a broader base of support than the previous minority 
government for an extensive programme of austerity measures (Diário de Noticias, 
2011). In a much reported speech in Parliament, Passos Coelho declared that if “saving 
the country” meant losing the next elections, then “never mind the elections” (Público 
2012). Indeed, assessments of the reform record of the PSD-CDS/PP government 
confirmed that it had gone further than the Troika’s requirements in a number of 
domains (see online appendix on extent of spending cuts), and secured a reputation of 
“good pupil” which contrasted with Greece. In fact, some measures of savings on public 
sector pensions and pay were so far-reaching that they were even ruled as 
unconstitutional by the Portuguese constitutional court. 
Passive cooperation between government and opposition persisted to some 
extent even after the new right-wing government came to power, but declined 
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afterwards. For instance, the PS still passively supported the 2012 budget in the name of 
the “national interest” (Diário Económico 2011b). Later on, however, the socialists 
adopted an increasingly more adversarial strategy towards the government as the 
economic situation worsened throughout 2012, and a number of popular protests were 
held. They voted against the 2013 budget in September 2012, and presented a motion of 
no confidence against the government in late March 2013 (Diário Económico 2012) and 
after the EP elections of May 2014. As a whole, however, austerity reforms in Portugal 
have been carried out in a negotiated manner across mainstream parties, even if party 
agreements have been somewhat fragile. The strategy adopted by the PSD after it came 
back to power, namely “going further than the Troika” and endorsing a determined 
stance to cut spending, tends to support the idea that alienating clienteles was a minor 
concern in its reform agenda. 
Austerity Conflicts in Greece (2009-2011) 
According to Pappas (2013: 33), the Greek party system “was built to ensure the 
distribution of political rents”, and clientelistic linkages have played a much more 
important role than in Portugal. By contrast to the Portuguese experience, where parties 
were built from above without really penetrating society, the new parties that emerged 
in Greece after the fall of the short-lived regime of the colonels in 1974 extensively 
resorted to the old electoral clienteles and networks which existed prior to the 
dictatorship (Lyrintzis 2011: 3; Pappas 2009: 322). By contrast to Portuguese 
mainstream parties, Greek parties, and PASOK in particular invested massively in the 
building of mass organisations with large memberships. Accordingly, the membership 
of the two main parties was multiplied by 12 between 1976 and 2005 (from 47’000 to 
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600’000), while it increased only by 60% in Portugal (from 116’000 to 190’000) (Bosco 
and Morlino 2006: 334). While PASOK was initially built with a strong programmatic 
agenda, its mass organisation was soon taken over by “patrons” rather than partisans 
(Pappas 2009). Its organisational model diffused to New Democracy, thereby 
transforming the two main parties in large political machines for the distribution of 
political rents.  
While New Democracy under Karamanlis showed some liberal leanings, both 
parties soon came to rely extensively on the expansion of the public sector, or social 
benefits and immunity from the law to targeted social groups as a mode of electoral 
mobilisation (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2011; Nicolacopoulos 2005). Pappas (2013: 
37) argues that the Greek pattern of mass clientelism benefitted a much larger pool of 
beneficiaries than standard theories of patronage account for: “since society had been 
divided into two irreconcilable parts represented by parties regularly alternating in 
power, all citizens could reasonably expect to gain from patronage once their own party 
won elections”. This included public sector employees, recipients of social benefits and 
subsidies, and a number of protected professions enjoying preferential regulations, such 
as lawyers, pharmacists or taxi drivers (Pappas 2013: 37-38 ; see also Iordanoglou 
2013). 
The partisan patronage networks have also extended to organised interests, 
particularly the trade unions, which have developed different connections to parties 
from the Portuguese case. Greek labour unions have essentially been extensions of the 
mainstream parties (Lavdas 2005: 299) and have acted as lobbies within parties for the 
narrow interests of their predominantly male, older members within the public sector 
(Matsaganis 2007: 541). The biggest union confederation GSEE is structured along 
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political factions linked to both PASOK and ND. In 2011, union density within the 
public sector was five times higher than in Portugal, with 78.2% (see Table 1). By 
contrast to Portugal, closer connections between parties and unions have allowed for the 
kind of clientelistic exchange outlined above, notably with a massive expansion of the 
public sector over the 1990s and 2000s, far outpacing population growth (OECD 2011: 
70; Pappas 2013: 37-38). As dismissals in the public sector were unlawful, each party 
kept hiring a supplementary layer of party followers after each election.  
The thread of domestic reforms in Greece in the aftermath of the crisis 
accordingly differs from Portugal, most importantly because of the lack of significant 
compromises between government and the opposition. As mentioned above, contrary to 
Portugal, from 1995 to 2007 and the outbreak of the economic crisis, Greece enjoyed a 
period of continuous growth with rising incomes, consumption and employment levels 
(Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2011). This period of prosperity also hid persistent deficits, 
higher debt, and worsening competitiveness. Despite modest efforts towards fiscal 
consolidation through limited privatisations in the late 1980s and late 1990s, Greece did 
not implement any noteworthy structural reforms until 2007 (Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou 2008).  
In September 2009, PASOK won a landslide victory drawing on an expansionist 
agenda based on pay and pension increases, tax cuts and re-nationalisations in spite of a 
bad economic climate (Zartaloudis 2013a). In late 2009, when the crisis worsened, PM 
Papandreou announced a number of reforms to reduce the deficit, but it claimed that it 
would “protect the vulnerable and the middle class”, and that the government was “not 
here to dismantle the welfare state” (Financial Times 2009). Against this background, 
the recourse to the Troika bailout and the commitment to a drastic austerity programme 
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in April 2010, when the government found itself in a situation of quasi-default, came as 
a shock set against its electoral promises. After the signing of the bailout in May 2010, 
the recession intensified. This was coupled with massive cuts in public spending, 
notably benefits cuts, along with an unprecedented rise in taxation (Zartaloudis 2014). 
However, many of these reforms were inadequately implemented (European 
Commission, 2010, 2012), at least partly because they would significantly reduce the 
scope for clientelistic relations. Finance Minister Papaconstantinou, who was keen on 
implementing Troika-mandated reforms by the book, was eventually dismissed because 
of his dismal popularity within the party and with voters. He was replaced by E. 
Venizelos, characterised by a more traditional populist profile (Financial Times 2011a). 
Each austerity package resulted in the resignation of a number of PASOK MPs, and 
PASOK gradually saw its previously comfortable majority erode progressively. 
While the PASOK government was ambivalent about the recourse to official 
help to the Troika, the conservative opposition was clearly against it. New Democracy’s 
position differed sharply from the position of its Portuguese counterpart (PSD) in that it 
forcefully opposed austerity measures. The new leader of ND, Antonis Samaras, 
rejected the first Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and argued that austerity 
policies were squeezing demand out of the economy (ND 2010). Instead, Samaras 
advocated cuts in value-added tax, reductions in the tax rate of corporate profits and 
slashing employers’ social contributions, measures that were dismissed as “unrealistic” 
by the Troika (Financial Times 2011b). It consistently blamed PASOK for the problems 
that the country was facing. Accordingly, Vasilopoulou et al. (2013: 395-396) show that 
ND scored even higher than smaller opposition parties in their “index of blame shifting” 
that they developed, particularly when it came to budget debates. Unable to build a 
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broader base of support with the opposition on a second EU bailout, Papandreou ended 
up calling for a referendum on the package in November 2011, but eventually withdrew 
his proposal, accepting to step down as PM and be replaced by a government of national 
unity headed by former ECB vice-president Lucas Papademos to implement the second 
bailout package (Hope and Barker 2011). 
New elections were organised in May 2012: PASOK and ND were decimated, but 
no viable government could emerge. This period of uncertainty and intense polarisation 
ended with the new June 2012 elections, where ND marginally beat radical Left 
SYRIZA. Unlike the Portuguese PS and PSD, the two major Greek parties underwent a 
major electoral collapse: PASOK went down 31% in relation to 2009 (12.28%) while 
ND managed to gather 29% (down 4% from 2009), but had obtained only 18.8% in 
May. ND formed a coalition government with PASOK and a small splinter party from 
SYRIZA, Democratic Left. This government has appeared more stable and committed 
in implementing unpopular reforms in order to avoid a Euro exit (Zartaloudis, 2013a), 
but the downsizing of the public employment sector has remained an extremely 
contentious issue, many observers pointing to political clientelism as a major hindrance 
on substantial reforms in the public bureaucracy (Deutsche Welle 2013).  
Samaras made a significant U-turn after the June 2012 elections, abandoning its 
anti-memorandum rhetoric, endorsing the adjustment programme and agreeing on a 
number of reforms with PASOK. However, this reversal only came about when it 
became clear that the alternative was an exit of the Eurozone, whose consequences were 
perceived as even more damaging than those of austerity measures on the organisational 
base of parties. Tellingly, the hollowing out of ND and PASOK due to the reduction of 
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clientelistic opportunities for their members and voters has been publicly admitted by 
senior party figures within both PASOK and New Democracy.5  
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION 
Our analysis has shown a clear variation in the cooperation strategies of political 
parties in Greece and Portugal with respect to fiscal retrenchment during the sovereign 
debt crisis. Portuguese parties have agreed on a number of fiscal retrenchment 
measures at the onset of the crisis, even if more adversarial patterns emerged after a 
new right-wing coalition came to power. However as a whole, reforms have been 
mostly negotiated, and existing patterns of party competition have persisted throughout 
the crisis. By contrast, adversarial politics has been the leading feature of fiscal 
retrenchment reforms in Greece. More recently, ND and PASOK agreed to support 
reforms but these parties are more unpopular than ever. By contrast to Portugal, the 
Greek party system has been completely reshaped, with a collapse in the electoral 
strength of the traditional mainstream parties and the rise of a radical party on the left 
(SYRIZA) and an anti-system party on the right (Golden Dawn). We have argued that 
the greater difficulty in finding compromises about austerity in Greece was due to an 
often overlooked variable: the greater extent of clientelistic linkages. For Greek 
mainstream parties, agreeing to fiscal retrenchment or supporting them openly 
undermined their own organisational base which drew on the distribution of selective 
goods, while this was not the case for Portuguese parties, who did not rely to such an 
extent on these strategies. 
 Fiscal austerity is more problematic for parties relying to a larger extent on 
clientelistic linkages because its electoral consequences may be much more severe, as 
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the Greek case has shown. Clientelistic linkages tend to be both tighter and more 
volatile than programmatic linkages. Since clientelistic exchange involves the 
distribution of resources that are possibly more important to clients than mere 
ideological affinity (jobs and income streams), they tend to create a closer connection 
and interdependence between patrons and clients. If patrons’ ability to supply 
resources is undermined by austerity, there is nothing left that ties voters and parties, 
and clients may quickly desert their patron to find another one promising to supply 
resources. The incentives are different in the case of weak clientelistic linkages, in 
which the relationship between voter and party is both looser and more resilient. 
Voters and organised interests do not depend directly on parties for their resources, and 
policy drives towards austerity politics may be less constrained by vote-seeking 
concerns, as we have shown in the Portuguese case. 
In this concluding section, we also seek to assess a number of alternative 
explanations to our argument focused on linkages. The first rival explanation would go 
along a functionalist argument linking the size of the adjustment required with 
different levels of party conflict. Hence, the more adversarial relationships between 
parties in Greece could be due to the much greater dose of retrenchment that was 
required by external actors, and the greater severity of the crisis during the period 
observed (see appendix). This line of argument, however, does not explain differences 
across time. There is no linear relationship between the level of party conflict and the 
extent of the crisis within each country. While in Portugal, compromises have tended 
to erode when the crisis worsened and the reforms failed to deliver results, in Greece 
the opposite was the case. Hence, there is no mechanic relationship between the extent 
of the crisis and patterns of party cooperation. Another argument linked to policy 
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would explain different levels of conflict by the specific “policy mix” of reforms, for 
instance between spending cuts and tax increases. However, it is difficult to argue that 
a different policy mix could have allowed compromises in Greece insofar as ND, 
before it came back to power, questioned the necessity of fiscal adjustment altogether 
rather than its content.  
This leads us to our second alternative explanation, party competition. In 
Greece, mainstream parties had an incentive to oppose austerity because protest parties 
on the left and the right (such as SYRIZA or Golden Dawn) were credible electoral 
alternatives. In Portugal, however, protest parties – essentially on the left – were not 
perceived as credible alternatives, and have stayed astonishingly weak. In this context, 
the risk of electoral sanction for retrenchment was much greater in Greece than in 
Portugal. Besides sanctions in the polls, anti-austerity protests led by particularly 
militant trade unions have also been shown to be much more adversarial in Greece than 
in other countries, possibly due to an entrenched tradition of violent resistance 
(Andronikidou and Kovras 2012). 
However, one may argue that both the emergence of protest parties and more 
radical forms of protest in Greece were connected to the higher density and volatility of 
clientelistic linkages outlined above. The transformation of the Greek political 
landscape has probably more to do with the collapse of the PASOK-ND clientelistic 
system than with a massive ideological realignment of the electorate. Mass clientelism 
led Greek parties to systematically over-promise, and voters to over-expect, which led 
to brutal sanctions and anger when these promises had to be betrayed (see Zartaloudis 
2013a). In contrast, Portuguese parties did not promise as much, and voters did not 
expect much from them either. Another factor explaining compromise is the fact that the 
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Portuguese PS government only controlled a minority in parliament , and an outright 
lack of cooperation from the PSD would have caused a much earlier fall of the 
government, making perhaps the opposition look politically irresponsible. However, the 
subsequent austerity drive of the PSD in power and intermittent cooperation from the 
PS is better explained by our linkages argument than this type of power fragmentation 
argument (see, e.g Zohlnhöfer 2007). 
Finally, we should also consider that the period under scrutiny in Greece was 
after the country was bailed out, while the socialist government in Portugal was in place 
before the bailout. However, the type of external constraints in place before the bailout 
were not substantially different given the very small fiscal room for manoeuvre, either 
due to market (bond yields) or political constraints. Timing may nevertheless have 
played a role in terms of the interdependence of cases: Portuguese parties may have 
anticipated that the conflicts observed in Greece would drag the country into an even 
worse situation.  
Given the fluidity of the Eurozone crisis, it is difficult to assess the external 
validity of our explanation in other cases. Spain seemed to display patterns relatively 
similar to Portugal, while Italy - which also displays high levels of clientelistic linkages 
in Kitschelt’s (2013) database – underwent significant instability with the formation of a 
technocratic government and the rise of an anti-establishment party (Beppe Grillo’s 
Movimento Cinque Stelle). This echoes developments we document in Greece. Ireland, 
for its part, also displayed cooperative patterns of policymaking in austerity in spite of 
the substantial collapse of the hitherto dominant Fianna Fáil. The connection between 
the nature of party-voter linkages and support for austerity policies that we have 
26 
 
outlined here can hopefully open new avenues for research on countries forced into hard 
policy choices. 
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1 In the case of Spain, the bailout granted at the end of 2012 was restricted to the 
banking sector.  
2 In line with this, Vasilopoulou et al. (2014: 390) argue that the dynamics of the Greek 
political system shifted after 2011 with the emergence of a technocratic government, 
and also restrict their analysis to the period before this point. As the impact of party 
competition was partly suspended during this period, we limit our analysis to the 
previous period. 
3 Average of expert replies to question “Consider whether candidates or parties give or 
promise to give citizens preferential access to employment in the public sector or in the 
publicly regulated private sector. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to 
attract voters by providing preferential access to employment opportunities? [1] A 
negligible effort or none at all [2] A minor effort; [3] A moderate effort; [4] A major 
effort. 
4 Appendix available at http://bit.ly/data_jepp_grepor  
5 A long-standing senior member of PASOK and Vice-President of the 2009-2011 
PASOK government Theodore Pagkalos authored a book titled ‘We ate them all 
together’, whereby he argues that Greece’s financial predicament resulted from long-
term fiscal mismanagement which promoted clientelism and corruption, and that now 
the opposition argues for the continuation of this policy (Pagkalos 2012). Likewise, a 
ND MP admitted after the 2014 European elections that ND has lost a key part of its 
electorate as it cannot provide anymore the clientelistic favours that these voters were 
demanding from the party (Skai 2014)  
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